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Intuitively, player i is only interested in getting the items in Σ i (or some more) and its valuation for these items is θ i . Note that in the single-minded case every player simply reports a pair (S i , b i ) (not necessarily equal to (Σ i , θ i )) to the auctioneer. Thus, the input can be represented compactly and is polynomial in n and m. The allocation problem for the single-minded case is as follows: Given the bids {(S i , b i ) i∈N }, determine a subset W ⊆ N of winners such that S i ∩ S j = / 0 for every i, j ∈ W , i = j, with maximum social welfare ∑ i∈W b i .
Theorem 4.3. The allocation problem for single-minded bidders is NP-hard.
Proof. We give a polynomial-time reduction from the NP-complete problem independent set. The independent set problem is as follows: Given an undirected graph G = (V, E) and a non-negative integer k, determine whether there exists an independent set of size at least k. 3 Given an instance (G, k) of the independent set problem, we can construct a singleminded combinatorial auction as follows: The set of items M corresponds to the edge set E of G. We associate a player i ∈ N with every vertex u i ∈ V of G. The bundle that player i desires corresponds to the set of all adjacent edges, i.e., S i := {e = {u i , u j } ∈ E}, and the value that i assigns to its bundle S i is b i = 1. Now observe that a set W ⊆ N of winners satisfies S i ∩ S j = / 0 for every i = j ∈ W iff the set of vertices corresponding to W constitute an independent set in G. Moreover, the social welfare obtained for W is exactly the size of the independet set.
Given the above hardness result and insisting on polynomial-time computability, we are thus forced to consider approximation algorithms. The idea is to relax the efficiency condition and to ask for an outcome that is (only) approximately efficient. We call a mechanism α-efficient for some α ≥ 1 if it computes an allocation a ∈ O (assuming truthful bidding
The proof of Theorem 4.3 even shows that the reduction is approximation preserving. That is, it specifies a bijection that preserves the objective function values of the corresponding solutions (of the allocation problem and the independent set problem). It is known that the independent set problem is hard even from an approximation point of view:
Fact 4.1. For every fixed ε > 0, there is no O(n 1−ε )-approximation algorithm for the independent set problem, where n denotes the number of vertices in the graph (unless NP ⊆ ZPP).
Since the number of edges in a (simple) directed graph is at most O(n 2 ), we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 4.1. For every fixed ε > 0, there is no O(m 1/2−ε )-efficient mechanism for single-minded bidders, where m denotes the number of items (unless NP ⊆ ZPP).
The following lemma characterizes properties of strategyproof mechanisms for singleminded bidders. 
Critical value:
A bidder who wins pays the minimum value, also called the critical value, needed for winning, i.e., the payment is the minimum over all values b i such that (S i , b i ) still wins.
Proof. We only prove the "if" part of the lemma. We first observe that a truthful bidder will never receive a negative utility: His utility is zero when he loses. In order to win, his valuation v i = b i must be at least the critical value, which is exactly his payment. We next show that a bidder i can never improve his utility by reporting some bid
is a losing bid (zero utility), or if S i does not contain Σ i (nonpositive utility), then clearly reporting (Σ i , θ i ) can only help.
Assume that (S i , b i ) is a winning bid and S i ⊇ Σ i . We first show that i is never worse off by reporting (Σ i , b i ) instead of (S i , b i ). Let p i be the payment for (S i , b i ) and let p i be the payment for (Σ i , b i ). Note that (Σ i , b i ) is a winning bid by monotonicity. For every x < p i , bidding (Σ i , x) will lose since p i is a critical value. By monotonicity, (S i , x) will also be a losing bid for every x < p i and therefore the critical value p i is at least p i . It follows that by bidding (Σ i , b i ) instead of (S i , b i ), player i still wins and his payment does not increase.
Next, we show that player i is not worse off by bidding (Σ i , θ i ) instead of bidding the winning bid (Σ i , b i ). First suppose that (Σ i , θ i ) is a winning bid with payment (critical value) p i . As long as b i ≥p i , player i still wins by bidding (Σ i , b i ) (by monotonicity) and receives the same payment (by critical value). If b i <p i , player i loses and receives zero utility.
Algorithmus 4 Greedy mechanism for single-minded bidders.
1: Collect the bids {(S i , b i ) i∈N } of all players. 2: Reindex the bids such that
if no items in S i have been assigned to players in W , i.e., S i ∩ j∈W S j = / 0 then 6: add i to W : W ← W ∪ {i}.
7:
end if 8: end for 9: for each i ∈ W do 10: define i's payment as:
where j > i is the smallest index such that S i ∩S j = / 0 and for all k < j, k = i, S k ∩S j = / 0; if no such j exists, set p i := 0. 11: end for 12: return (W, p)
In both cases, misreporting does not increase the utility of player i. Finally, suppose that player i loses by bidding (Σ i , θ i ). Then θ i must be smaller than the critical value and thus the payment for the winning bid (Σ i , b i ) will be greater than θ i . Therefore, the utility that player i receives by bidding (Σ i , b i ) is negative.
We next devise a mechanism that is strategyproof and √ m-approximate efficient. Thus, from a computational point of view, this is the best we can hope for. The mechanism is the greedy algorithm described in Algorithm 4.
Theorem 4.4. The greedy mechanism is strategyproof, √ m-efficient and runs in polynomial-time.
Lets verify that the greedy mechanism satisfies the two properties of Lemma 4.2 and is thus strategyproof. It is easy to see that the greedy mechanism satisfies monotonicity: Suppose (S i , b i ) is a winning bid. If player i increases his bid or submits a subset S i ⊂ S i , he can only move further to the front of the greedy ordering. Since S i is disjoint from all sets S j of previously picked players j ∈ W , i remains a winner. Next consider the critical value property. The critical value of a winning bid (S i , b i ) corresponds to the bid b i for which (S i , b i ) still wins. Consider Step 10 of Algorithm 4. (S i , b i ) remains a winning bid as long as b i ≥ p i , since if b i < p i player j preceds i in the greedy order and thus j wins and prevents i to enter the winning set W . Thus the payment p i corresponds to the critical value.
